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Abstract
In this project we study the dynamic behavior of Sum Celebrity and Max Celebrity Games
defined in A`lvarez et al. 2016 and A`lvarez & Messegue´ 2016, respectively. These works an-
alyze the structural properties of the Nash equilibrium graphs and the relationship between
the social cost and the optimal social cost (Price of the Anarchy and Price of Stability)
according to the parameters that define these games: alpha or cost of each link, beta or
critical distance and weights of each of the players.
In this project we analyze different dynamics of the Sum and Max Celebrity Games models
and their convergence to equilibrium configurations as a function of the critical distance.
A dynamics consists of a sequence of movements where both the policy to select the
player and the kind of selfish strategy that the corresponding player applies, can affect
convergence. The starting point is that in both models the Best Response strategy of a
player is computable in polynomial time for β = 1, but NP-hard for β > 1.
Due to this difference in behavior, both cases have been analyzed separately. For β = 1
we have obtained that for both models the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium is
polynomial time. Furthermore, in the case of Max we have proven the existence of cycles
in a Best Response dynamics, in contrast to the Sum where they are not possible. Since
the problem of computing a Best Response for both models when β > 1 is NP-hard, we
have proposed a greedy model in which the possible strategies of a player are restricted.
Although the existence of cycles is proven, we have not found experimentally a cyclic
instance for the Sum and Max Greedy Celebrity Games.
Resum
En aquest projecte estudiem el comportament dina`mic del Sum Celebrity i Max Celebrity
Games definits per A`lvarez et al. 2016 i A`lvarez & Messegue´ 2016, respectivament. Aquests
treballs analitzen les propietats estructurals dels equilibris de Nash junt amb la relacio´ entre
el cost social i el cost social o`ptim (Preu de l’anarquia i Preu de l’estabilitat) d’acord amb
els para`metres que defineixen aquests jocs: alfa o cost de l’enllac¸, beta o dista`ncia cr´ıtica
i els pesos de cadascun dels jugadors.
En aquest projecte analitzem les diferents dina`miques dels models del Sum i Max Celebrity
Games i la seva converge`ncia a configuracions d’equilibri en funcio´ de la dista`ncia cr´ıtica.
Una dina`mica consisteix en una sequ¨e`ncia de moviments on la pol´ıtica de seleccio´ del
jugador i el tipus d’estrate`gia egoista que el jugador corresponent aplica, pot afectar la
converge`ncia. El punt de partida e´s que en ambdo´s models calcular la Best Response per
a un jugador e´s computable en temps polino`mic per β = 1, pero` NP-hard per β > 1.
A causa d’aquesta difere`ncia en el comportament, els dos casos han estat analitzats per
separat. Per β = 1 hem obtingut que per a tots dos models el problema de calcular un
equilibri de Nash e´s temps polino`mic. A me´s, en el cas del Max hem demostrat l’existe`ncia
de cicles en una dina`mica en la qual s’aplica el Best Response, en contraposicio´ amb el
Sum on no so´n possibles. Ate`s que el problema de calcular la Best Response per a tots
dos models quan β > 1 e´s NP-hard, hem proposat un model greedy en que` les possibles
estrate`gies d’un jugador estan restringides. Tot i que esta` demostrat l’existe`ncia de cicles,
no hem trobat experimentalment una insta`ncia c´ıclica per als jocs Sum i Max Greedy
Celebrity Games.
Resumen
En este proyecto estudiamos el comportamiento dina´mico del Sum Celebrity y Max Cele-
brity Games definidos por A´lvarez et al. 2016 y A´lvarez & Messegue´ 2016, respectivamente.
Estos trabajos analizan las propiedades estructurales de los equilibrios de Nash junto con
la relacio´n entre el coste social y el coste social o´ptimo (Precio de la anarqu´ıa y Precio
de la estabilidad) de acuerdo con los para´metros que definen estos juegos: alfa o coste del
enlace, beta o distancia cr´ıtica y los pesos de cada uno de los jugadores.
En este proyecto analizamos las diferentes dina´micas de los modelos del Sum y Max Cele-
brity Games y su convergencia en configuraciones de equilibrio en funcio´n de la distancia
cr´ıtica. Una dina´mica consiste en una secuencia de movimientos donde la pol´ıtica de se-
leccio´n del jugador y el tipo de estrategia ego´ısta que el jugador correspondiente aplica,
puede afectar la convergencia. El punto de partida es que en ambos modelos calcular la
Best Response para un jugador es computable en tiempo polino´mico para β = 1, pero
NP-hard para β > 1.
Debido a esta diferencia en el comportamiento, ambos casos han sido analizados por se-
parado. Para β = 1 hemos obtenido que para ambos modelos el problema de calcular un
equilibrio de Nash es tiempo polino´mico. Adema´s, en el caso del Max hemos demostrado
la existencia de ciclos en una dina´mica en la que se aplica el Best Response, en contraposi-
cio´n con el Sum donde no son posibles. Dado que el problema de calcular la Best Response
para ambos modelos cuando β > 1 es NP-hard, hemos propuesto un modelo greedy en el
que las posibles estrategias de un jugador esta´n restringidas. Aunque esta´ demostrado la
existencia de ciclos, no hemos encontrado experimentalmente una instancia c´ıclica para los
juegos Sum y Max Greedy Celebrity Games.
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1 Introduction
In this chapter we explain the motivation in conducting research, the context of the project,
the objectives and how the manuscript has been structured.
1.1 Motivation and Context
Game Theory is a branch of mathematics whose aim is the study of models where a set of
agents interact with each other following some objectives or interests. These models usually
try to be as simple as possible but whose results can be applied in the real world. Since
the appearance of the Internet, there has been a great interest in analyzing communication
networks. This interest comes from many diverse scientific communities: computer science,
artificial intelligence, networking and economics among others.
Those networks are built by selfish agents in a decentralized way without coordination
among the agents, where each of them wants to improve their connectivity using as little
investment as possible. This fact was an obstacle to perform the analysis using the classic
Network theory. A common way to approach the problem is by using Game Theory, as
we have already mentioned, deals with problems of similar nature. The concrete area that
intersects Game Theory and Computer Science is called Algorithmic Game Theory. From
an Algorithmic Game Theory point of view, the internet-like networks can be considered
as a state of equilibrium of a strategic game played by selfish agents.
Strategic Games model the interaction between a set of players. In these games, each player
has a set of possible actions where the preference over one or the other is affected by the
actions chosen by the other players. In this interaction between players the network can
stabilize. This situation in which no player has incentive to change the strategy is called
Nash equilibrium. Once it is defined how the social cost is calculated, in this interaction
there will be configurations that are socially optimal, that is, the social cost is minimized.
The ratio between the maximum social cost of the Nash equilibria and the optimal social
cost is defined as Price of Anarchy.
The study of the formation of networks from the point of view of Strategic Games is a
relatively recent topic. A seminal paper in the study of models trying to explain the
behavior of different agents that conform internet, is the one of Fabrikant et al. [1]. The
authors introduce by now the classic Network Creation Games model (NCG) where selfish
agents without central coordination pay for links that they establish unilaterally and takes
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advantage of the shortest-path to all the nodes. Therefore, the cost of each agent has two
components: the cost of the creation of links and the sum of the distances from this agent
to the rest. We can consider other cost functions as proposed in Demaine et al. [2], where
instead of computing the sum of the distances, the maximum is computed
In this project we focus on Celebrity Games. A model recently proposed by A`lvarez et al.
[3, 4]. In this interpretation of Network Formation it is considered that not all players are
equally important. The relevance of each player is assigned by their weight, the heavier
the weight, the more relevant is in the network. Therefore, the rest of players will want to
be as close as possible to him. The cost of a player is the sum of the total cost of the links
he has bought and the sum of the weights of the players he does not have close enough. To
indicate what distance is considered close we use what we call critical distance, represented
by β. This parameter indicates that players at a distance less than or equal to the critical
distance are considered close enough and therefore they are not computed in the cost of
the player in question. We also do the study for the max version introduced by A`lvarez et
al. [5].
In this work we study the dynamics of the model. By dynamics we refer to turn the model
into a sequential process and focus on the formation of the network through the interaction
of selfish agents. In this process time is discretised in turns, where at each turn only one
agent can change his strategy. For that reason, we need a turn policy that determines how
the turns are distributed among the agents. We call response policy the way in which a
agent determines his new strategy. Since agents act selfishly, the most natural response
policy is the Best Response, in which the new strategy is one of those that minimize his
cost.
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1.2 Project contribution
Understanding the dynamics of decentralized and selfish networks without coordination
among agents can help us to understand the behaviour of networks like the Internet. This
knowledge can help us to develop better mechanisms that guide agents locally to globally
better states.
The analysis of the dynamics in the classic model was made by Lenzner et at. [6, 7]. In
this project, the main objective is to perform a similar analysis but for Celebrity Games.
As for the classic model, we investigate natural dynamics such as Best Response dynamics.
We know beforehand that the computational complexity of computing a Best Response
of a player in the Celebrities depends on the critical distance, represented by β. For that
reason we have divided the analysis into β = 1 and β > 1.
In the case of β = 1, we know that the problem of computing a Best Response is polynomial
time solvable but we do not know if the dynamics has cycles, that is to say, the players
can reach a situation in which they have been previously, and if we can compute a Nash
equilibrium in a reasonable time.
Since for β > 1 the problem of computing a Best Response is NP-hard and agents cannot
afford exponential running time, they have to resort to an approximation of the best
possible strategy. For that reason, we will analyze a greedy model in which the possible
new strategies of a player are only those in which he adds, removes or swaps a link from
his current strategy. In addition, we want to experiment to see how frequent the cycles
are since there are previous results where cycles have been found. Furthermore, we will
analyze the time of convergence, that is, the number of turns that we have to give to the
players to reach an equilibrium.
11
1.3 Project outline
This document structure is the following one:
• In Chapter 2 we introduce the necessary definitions and concepts and we give a
detailed description of the model to study.
• In Chapter 3 we study the Sum Celebrity Games dynamics for β = 1.
• In Chapter 4 we study the Max Celebrity Games dynamics for β = 1.
• In Chapter 5 we study the Sum and Max Celebrity Games dynamics for β > 1.
• In Chapter 6 we do the experimental study of Sum and Max Celebrity Games for
β > 1.
• Finally, in Chapter 7 we summarize the main contributions and analyze the open
problems.
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2 Preliminaries
In this chapter we provide the basic concepts of Game Theory, we present the model of
Celebrity Games, and we introduce the concept of dynamics. In addition, we summarize
the previous known work about Celebrity Games.
2.1 Strategic Games
Since Network Creation Games and in particular Celebrity Games are Strategic Games,
we first define the general concepts in order to later go into specific details.
Strategic Games model the interaction between decision-makers, that we usually refer to
as players. Each player has a set of possible actions or strategies to choose and his decision
may depend on the actions of the rest of the players.
Definition 1. A strategic game is defined as a tuple Γ = 〈V, (S(u))u∈V , (cu)u∈V 〉 where:
• V = {1, ..., n}, a set of players.
• for each player u ∈ V , S(u) is the set of strategies or actions.
The strategy profile S = (S1, ..., Sn) is a n-tuple formed by the actions chosen by the
players, where for each player i ∈ V , Si ∈ S(i). Therefore, we denote all the possible
strategy profiles of Γ as S(Γ) = S(1)× ...× S(n).
For a strategy profile S = (S−u, Su) ∈ S(Γ) we denote by (S−u, S ′u) the strategy
profile that is obtained from S in which player u has changed his strategy Su by S ′u,
(S−u, S ′u) = (S1, ..., Su−1, S ′u, Su+1, ..., Sn).
• cu : S(Γ)→ R, is the cost function of player u.
It is worth noting that the value of cu may depend on the chosen actions or strategies
of all players.
Given a strategy profile S of a game, in order to compare a players cost depending
on the chosen strategy we will denote by ∆(S−u, S ′u) = cu(S−u, S ′u)− cu(S).
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2.1.1 Nash Equilibria
An important concept related to Strategic Games is the concept called Nash Equilibrium,
that we will refer as NE. In some games there is a strategy profile or configuration where
no player wants to unilaterally modify his strategy since he cannot strictly decrease his
current cost.
Definition 2. Given a strategic game Γ = 〈V, (S(u))u∈V , (cu)u∈V 〉 we say that a strategy
profile S ∈ S(Γ) is a NE if
∀u ∈ V, ∀S ′u ∈ S(u) ∆(S−u, S ′u) ≥ 0
Since the agents act selfishly it is reasonable to think that they will choose their best
strategy given the actions of the other players. For this purpose we introduce the concept
of Best Response.
Definition 3. Given a strategic game Γ = 〈V, (S(u))u∈V , (cu)u∈V 〉 and S ∈ S(Γ), the set
of Best responses of player u to S−u is defined as follows:
BR(S, u) = {S∗u ∈ S(u) | ∀S ′u ∈ S(u) cu(S−u, S∗u) ≤ cu(S−u, S ′u)}
2.1.2 Price of Anarchy
In addition to the cost of each player we want to measure how good a configuration is for
the whole society, that is, the set of players. In order to be able to evaluate this we define
an objective function, usually known as social cost.
Definition 4. Let Γ = 〈V, (S(u))u∈V , (cu)u∈V 〉 be a strategic game. Given a strategy profile
S ∈ S(Γ) we define the social cost as
C(S) =
∑
u∈V
cu(S)
In this way, now we can compare configurations and know which is is socially better.
One way to evaluate whether the social cost of a configuration is good or not is to compare
it against the optimal social cost. We define socially optimal configurations as follows.
Definition 5. Let Γ = 〈V, (S(u))u∈V , (cu)u∈V 〉 be a strategic game. A strategy profile
S ∈ S(Γ) is socially optimal if
∀S ′ ∈ S(Γ) C(S) ≤ C(S ′)
Let OPT (Γ) be the set of all strategy profiles that are socially optimal in Γ.
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Note that strategy profiles with optimal social cost might not be NE.
A doubt that arises is: since agents act in a selfish way, how inefficient is the equilibrium for
the fact of not cooperating for the benefit of the whole? It is considered that a configuration
benefits the society if it minimizes the social cost.
To determine the quality of Nash equilibria we use the ratio between the worst social cost of
the worst equilibrium and the optimum social cost. This ratio is know as Price of Anarchy.
Definition 6. Let Γ = 〈V, (S(u))u∈V , (cu)u∈V 〉 be a strategic game, let NE(Γ) ⊆ S(Γ) be
the set of Nash Equilibria and S∗ ∈ OPT (Γ). Then the Price of Anarchy is
PoA(Γ) = maxS∈NE(Γ)C(S)
C(S∗)
2.1.3 Example: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
For better understanding we explain a classic example in order to clarify the different
concepts introduced.
”Two crime suspects have to choose between confessing to a crime or stay quiet. They
cannot interact with each other, so they cannot know beforehand the decision of the other.
The possibilities are as follows: if both stay quiet they will not be sentenced to the maxi-
mum penalty but will be punished with 2 years. If one of them finks, his sentence will be
reduced to 1 year and the other suspect will be punished with 5 years, that is the maximum
penalty. If they both fink they will be sentenced to 4 years, instead of 5, for cooperating
with the authorities.”
Formally, the game is represented by Γ = 〈V = {1, 2}, (S1, S2), (c1, c2)〉, where
• The players of the game are the criminals.
• Their actions are identical since they can confess or stay quiet. S1 = S2 = {Fink,Quiet}.
Therefore, S = S1 × S2 = {(Quiet,Quiet), (Quiet,Fink), (Fink,Quiet), (Fink,Fink)}
• We can represent the cost of each player as the years in prison:
c1(Quiet,Quiet) = c2(Quiet,Quiet) = 2
c1(Fink,Fink) = c2(Fink,Fink) = 4
c1(Quiet,Fink) = c2(Fink,Quiet) = 5
c1(Fink,Quiet) = c2(Quiet,Fink) = 1
It can be represented in a compact way using the following table:
15
Suspect 2
Quiet Fink
Suspect 1 Quiet 2,2 5,1Fink 1,5 4,4
Table 2.1: Table of the cost incurred of the four configurations
We observe how the only situation of equilibrium is when both confess. In other cases, at
least one player can improve his cost by going from not confessing to confessing. Even so,
the social optimum occurs when both stay quiet.
In this case, because both do not seek the social optimum but instead act selfishly, we
observe a PoA of C(Fink,F ink)
C(Quiet,Quiet) = 2.
In other words, the social cost of the worst equilibrium, which in this case is the only one,
is twice the optimum social cost.
2.1.4 Example: A simple Network Creation Game
Let us introduce a closer example of what we will deal with throughout the project. We
define the game as the tuple Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α〉, where:
• V = {1, ..., n} is the set of players.
• wu > 0 is the weight of player u ∈ V .
• α > 0 is the link cost.
Each player represents a node of a graph and the strategy of u is Su ∈ P(V −{u}), where
P is the power set. The strategy of u represents the players to whom he buys a link.
Let the cost function of a player u be cu(S) = α|Su|+∑{v | v/∈Su∧u/∈Sv}wv.
The strategy profile S determines an undirected graph, defined by G[S] = (V, {{u, v} | u ∈
Sv ∨ v ∈ Su}). The directed version of G[S] also determines who have bought the link,
(u, v) is an edge of the directed graph if v ∈ Su.
Let Γ = 〈{0, 1, 2}, (wu)u∈V , 4〉, where w0 = 7, w1 = 6 and w2 = 5.
Let the strategy profile S = (S0, S1, S2) = (∅, {0}, ∅), then we can represent the strategy
profile as follows:
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Figure 2.1: Strategy profile S of Γ
If we compute the Best Response for player 0 in S we have S ′0 ∈ BR(S, 0). The new
strategy profile is S ′ = (S−0, S ′0). It is easy to see that the Best Response for him is to buy
the link to 2 since w2 > α and is not yet adjacent.
Figure 2.2: Strategy profile S ′ of Γ
If player 2 applies the Best Response to S ′ now he will buy a link to 0 for the same reason.
At this time no player will want to change his strategy, so we will be in a situation of
Nash equilibrium. It is easy to see that all the NE are a 3-clique in the undirected graph.
Otherwise, if S is the strategy profile of Γ and u is a player, since ∀i ∈ V wi > α if
v /∈ Su ∧ u /∈ Sv, we can define S ′u = Su ∪ {v} and we have ∆(S−u, S ′u) = α− wv < 0.
17
2.2 Celebrity Games
Network Creation Games (NCG) are a type of strategic games that model how a network
behaves based on the parameters that characterize it. By now the classic NCG model was
proposed by Fabrikant et al. [1]. In this model agents without centralized coordination
establish links to other nodes in order to be as well connected as possible in the network.
The cost of each player has two components: firstly the cost of the purchased links and
secondly the sum of the distance from the node to the rest.
In this project we are going to study Celebrity Games, a new model of Network Creation
Games recently proposed by A`lvarez et al. [3, 4, 5]. This model allows us to characterize
another point of view of the networks. First of all, this model assigns relevance to each
agent through his weight. The heavier the weight, the more important he is in the network.
Secondly, it includes the concept of critical distance. Instead of adding the distances
between the node and the rest, it adds the weight of the nodes that are at a distance
greater than the critical. In addition, it maintains the concept of link cost.
Intuitively, the goal of each agent in the celebrity games is to connect, or at least be at a
reasonable distance, to the most relevant nodes by using the least number of links.
Definition 7. A Celebrity Game is defined by Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉, where:
• V = {1, ..., n} is the set of players.
• wu > 0 is the weight of player u ∈ V .
• α > 0 is the link cost.
• 1 ≤ β ≤ n− 1 is the critical distance.
We use W to refer to the sum of the weights, W = ∑u∈V {wu} as well as wmin =
minu∈V {wu} and wmax = maxu∈V {wu}
A strategy for a player u in Γ is Su ⊆ V − {u}, represents the set of nodes to which the
player u has purchased a link. The strategy profile S of a game Γ is defined as in the
strategic games S = (S1, ..., Sn).
Every strategy profile S determines a non-directed graph associated with it, defined by
G[S] = (V, {{u, v} | u ∈ Sv ∨ v ∈ Su}). The directed version of G[S] is given by S, i.e.,
(u, v) is an edge of the directed graph if v ∈ Su.
The way we define the cost of player u in strategy profile S will bring us various variants
of the game which we will study later. This versions are defined in [3, 4] and [5]. Their
cost functions are respectively:
• Sum Celebrity Game: cu(S) = α|Su|+∑{v | dG[S](u,v)>β}wv
• Max Celebrity Game: cu(S) = α|Su|+ max{v | dG[S](u,v)>β}wv
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We will refer to the Sum and Max versions of Celebrity Game as SUM-CG and MAX-CG,
respectively.
The following is a summary of the more relevant results in [3, 4, 5] for this project.
First of all, for both versions we have well differentiated results between β = 1 and β > 1.
In both models, for β = 1 the problem of computing a Best Response for a player is
polynomial time solvable. In addition, in the case of SUM-CG we have that PoA is at
most 2 and in the case of MAX-CG, PoA = O(wmax/wmin).
However, for β > 1 the problem of computing a Best Response for a player becomes
NP-hard.
In addition, we have the following main results for the SUM-CG when β > 1:
• The optimal social cost of a game Γ depends on the relation between W and α,
OPT (Γ) = min{α,W}(n− 1).
• Every NE graph is either connected or the graph In.
We refer to the game as star celebrity game if has a NE graph that is connected. Γ
is star celebrity game if α < wmax or α ≥ wmax and there is at most one u ∈ V for
which α > W − wu.
• If G is a NE graph of a star celebrity game then diam(G) ≤ 2β + 1.
• If G is a NE graph of a star celebrity game then PoA = O(min{n/β,W/α}).
And the main results for the MAX-CG when β > 1, are the following:
• The optimal social cost of a game Γ depends on the relation between wmax and α,
2α(n− 1) ≥ OPT (Γ) ≥ min{α(n− 1), wmax(n− 1) + wmin}.
• If G is a NE graph then diam(G) ≤ 2β + 2.
• PoA ≤ 2(wmax/α) and PoA(Γ) = O(n/β).
As we can see, Celebrity Games have a different behavior for β = 1 and β > 1. For this
reason we divide the theoretical part in each of the cases.
For β = 1 we make an in-depth study of the Best Response dynamics for both cases, since
is the natural way the agents will make the changes and its computation is polynomial
time solvable.
For β > 1, on the other hand, since the Best Response is NP-hard and agents cannot
take exponential time to compute their response, we examine a greedy model where the
response of a player is restricted. In this way, from a current strategy the only possible
responses are those in which the player can add, delete or swap one link. In this way
the problem of computing a Best Response is polynomial time. To conclude, A`lvarez &
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Messegue´ show in [8] that the greedy model we analyze admits cycles for β = 3 and β = 5
for the Sum and Max models, respectively.
Formally, the greedy model is defined as follows:
Definition 8. Greedy Celebrity Game (Greedy CG), agents can only: add, remove or swap
one link. If the original strategy is Su and the new is S ′u then: if added new edge Su ⊂ S ′u
and |Su| = |S ′u| − 1, if removed an edge Su ⊃ S ′u and |Su| − 1 = |S ′u| and finally, if swapped
|Su| = |S ′u| and |Su ∩ S ′u| = |Su| − 1.
This model induces a weaker equilibrium configuration:
Definition 9. Given a celebrity game Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 we say that a strategy profile
S ∈ S(Γ) is a Greedy Equilibrium (GE) if no agent can unilaterally strictly decrease her
cost by either buying or deleting or swapping one own edge.
In comparison with Nash Equilibrium, the Greedy Equilibrium is clearly a much weaker
solution. We have that NE ⊆ GE since if no agent can change his strategy to improve the
cost, then certainly no agent can improve by buying, deleting or swapping one own edge.
2.3 Dynamics in Celebrity Games
In order to analyze the dynamic behavior of networks whose topology and quality of equi-
libra depends on the critical distance, the price per link and the weight of the different
nodes, we study the dynamics of Sum and Max Celebrity Games, as well as both versions
of Greedy Celebrity Games.
We consider that the dynamic process is divided into rounds, in each round is selected
a single player who can change his strategy whenever it improves his current cost. How
the rounds are distributed among the players and how the change of strategy is chosen
determines the dynamics. We denote by S(i) the strategy profile or configuration at round
i ≥ 0 and S(i)u the strategy of player u in S(i).
Since only one agent can change his strategy at every round we need a turn policy that
determines how the rounds are distributed among the players. We call response policy the
way in which a player determines his new strategy. At each round i ≥ 0, S(i) is updated
to S(i+1) by changing the strategy of a player u, selected by the turn policy, from S(i)u to
S(i+1)u by applying the response policy.
In order to define completely a network creation process we combine the following ingre-
dients: the version of the game (one of the four different combinations between SUM and
MAX with CG and Greedy CG), an initial configuration, the response policy and a turn
policy. If some of these characteristics are not stated is because it is arbitrary. We will
often indicate the response policy before the name of the dynamics.
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3 Dynamics in Sum Celebrity Games
for β = 1
In this section we first analyze the computational cost of deciding whether a strategy profile
is NE or not. Subsequently, we analyze the Best Response SUM-CG dynamics in order to
determine if cycles are possible and if there is a dynamics that reach an equilibrium in a
reasonable computational time.
By Proposition 10 of [4] we have the following result:
Proposition 1. The problem of computing a Best Response of a player u to a strategy
profile in SUM-CG is polynomial time solvable.
Corollary 1. The problem of deciding whether a given strategy profile is a NE in SUM-CG
is polynomial time computable.
Proof. By definition we have that S = (S1, ..., Sn) is NE if
∀u ∈ V, ∀S ′u ∈ S(u) ∆(S−u, S ′u) ≥ 0
Since ∀u ∈ V ∀S ′u ∈ S(u) cu(S−u, S ′u) ≥ cu(S−u, S∗u) where S∗u ∈ BR(S, u) we only have to
check that
∀u ∈ V ∆(S−u, S∗u) ≥ 0
Then, given S, the algorithm goes through all the players and checks that for each player
his Best Response it is not better than their current strategy. Since executing the BR
is polynomial time computable, the overall execution of |V | times BR is also polynomial
time.
Now let us show some basic properties of SUM-CG when β = 1 that will be useful to us
later.
Let V>α = {u ∈ V | wu > α}, V=α = {u ∈ V | wu = α} and V<α = {u ∈ V | wu < α}.
Property 1. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, 1〉, S ∈ S(Γ), S ′u ∈ BR(S, u) and S ′ = (S−u, S ′u).
For an arbitrary player u we analyze for any v 6= u whether v ∈ S ′u or not:
(a) If u ∈ Sv then v /∈ S ′u.
Suppose v ∈ S ′u, define S ′′u = S ′u − {v}. We have ∆(S ′−u, S ′′u) = −α < 0, which
contradicts S ′u ∈ BR(S, u).
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(b) If u /∈ Sv, we have the following three cases:
(1) v ∈ V>α =⇒ v ∈ S ′u.
Suppose v /∈ S ′u, define S ′′u = S ′u ∪ {v}. We have ∆(S ′−u, S ′′u) = α − wv < 0,
which contradicts S ′u ∈ BR(S, u).
(2) v ∈ V<α =⇒ v /∈ S ′u.
Suppose v ∈ S ′u, define S ′′u = S ′u − {v}. We have ∆(S ′−u, S ′′u) = wv − α < 0,
which contradicts S ′u ∈ BR(S, u).
(3) v ∈ V=α =⇒ (v ∈ S ′u ∨ v /∈ S ′u).
The cost of buying or not the link is the same, since wv = α then both situations
are possible.
Proposition 2. For any initial configuration and any turn policy the Best Response SUM-
CG dynamics has no cycles.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that a cycle exists. By definition a cycle exists ⇐⇒
∃i, j, k with i < j < k : S(i) 6= S(j) ∧ S(i) = S(k). Therefore, a cycle exists if ∃i, j, k with
i < j < k and ∃u, v ∈ V ((v /∈ S(i)u ∧ v ∈ S(j)u ∧ v /∈ S(k)u ) ∨ (v ∈ S(i)u ∧ v /∈ S(j)u ∧ v ∈ S(k)u ))
Hence, there is at least a node u such that alternates between having a link to v in his
strategy and deleting such link. Such agent with wv 6= α exists, otherwise the cost would
remain the same by Property 1.(b.3), and by definition the cost has to be strictly decreasing.
If u first does not have the link, the only possibility to buy the link is to apply Property
1.(b.1), since it is the only one that as a result u buys the link when wv 6= α. Therefore,
wv > α. We have assumed u deletes this link in a subsequent round, but by Property 1.(a)
the node v will not buy a link to u and as a result by Property 1.(b.1) the node u will not
delete the link.
The argument is analogous if initially u has the link but applying the properties in the
opposite order.
This contradicts our assumption that there is a cycle when using Best Response as response
policy.
Proposition 3. The Best Response SUM-CG dynamics with a Round-robin turn policy
converges to a NE in at most 2|V | rounds.
Proof. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, 1〉 be a SUM-CG and S(0) any initial configuration.
The dynamics will consist of a sequence S(0), ..., S(2n) where in the transition from S(i) to
S(i+1) the ((i mod n) + 1)-th node updates its strategy applying the Best Response.
The sequence S(0), ..., S(2n) converges to a NE.
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Let V 6=α = {u ∈ V | wu 6= α} and let u, v ∈ V6=α two arbitrary agents such that u 6= v. We
first analyze the existence or non-existence of edges between two given agents after the 2n
rounds depending on their weights:
(a) u, v ∈ V>α.
In the first n rounds we have that u /∈ S(n)v ∨ v /∈ S(n)u , since at least one node would
apply Property 1.(a). But at the very least, there will be a node that has purchased
the link by Property 1.(b.1).
In n rounds the existence of the edge is definitive.
(b) u, v ∈ V<α.
In the first round of each node they remove (or not buy) the link, either by Property
1.(a) or 1.(b.2).
In n rounds the non-existence of the edge is definitive.
(c) u ∈ V>α and v ∈ V<α.
In the first n rounds u will delete (or not buy) the link to v by Property 1.(a) or
1.(b.2).
In the following n rounds the node v will buy the link (or not delete) by Property
1.(b.1).
In 2n rounds the existence of the edge is definitive.
In the worst case we need 2n rounds in order to guarantee the existence or non-existence
of a link between two nodes of weight different than α. Let us prove that S(2n) is a NE.
Suppose that S(2n) is not a NE. Therefore, there must be a node that can improve its cost,
let this node be u ∈ V .
Let us refer to 2n as k and let S(k+1)u ∈ BR(S(k), u), S(k+1) = (S(k)−u, S(k+1)u ) and let A =
S(k+1)u \ S(k)u , D = S(k)u \ S(k+1)u . As we have seen, the edges between nodes with weight
other than α are definitive, for that reason, the elements of A∪D have weight equal to α.
As u can improve its cost we have ∆(S(k)−u, S(k+1)u ) < 0.
∆(S(k)−u, S(k+1)u ) =
= cu(S(k+1))− cu(S(k)) =
= α|S(k+1)u |+
∑
{v | d
G[S(k+1)](u,v)>1}
wv −
α|S(k)u |+ ∑
{v | d
G[S(k)](u,v)>1}
wv
 =
= α(|S(k+1)u | − |S(k)u |) +
∑
{v | d
G[S(k+1)](u,v)>1}
wv −
∑
{v | d
G[S(k)](u,v)>1}
wv =
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= α(|A| − |D|) + ∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k+1)u ∧u/∈S(k+1)v }
wv −
∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k)u ∧u/∈S(k)v }
wv
We have that V − {u} = S(k)u ∪ {v 6= u | u ∈ S(k)v } ∪ {v 6= u | v /∈ S(k)u ∧ u /∈ S(k)v }.
Intuitively, these sets are: the nodes to which u has purchased a link, the nodes that have
purchased a link to u and the nodes that are not directly connected to u in round k. These
sets are disjoint, since there is no connection purchased by both endpoints at round 2n,
and are as a result a partition of V − {u}. The same applies for k + 1.
Figure 3.1: Partition of V − {u} in round k
α(|A| − |D|) + ∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k+1)u ∧u/∈S(k+1)v }
wv −
∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k)u ∧u/∈S(k)v }
wv =
= α(|A| − |D|) + ∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k+1)u }
wv −
∑
{v 6=u | u∈S(k+1)v }
wv
−
 ∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k)u }
wv −
∑
{v 6=u | u∈S(k)v }
wv

Since S(k)v = S(k+1)v when v 6= u,
α(|A| − |D|) + ∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k+1)u }
wv −
∑
{v 6=u | u∈S(k+1)v }
wv
−
 ∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k)u }
wv −
∑
{v 6=u | u∈S(k)v }
wv
 =
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= α(|A| − |D|) + ∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k+1)u }
wv −
∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k)u }
wv
Since D = S(k)u \ S(k+1)u , A = S(k+1)u \ S(k)u and ∀v ∈ (A ∪D) wv = α,
α(|A| − |D|) + ∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k+1)u }
wv −
∑
{v 6=u | v/∈S(k)u }
wv =
= α(|A| − |D|) + ∑
v∈D
wv −
∑
v∈A
wv =
= α(|A| − |D|) + α|D| − α|A| = 0
As a result, contradiction with the fact that S(2n) is not a NE.
Note that there are configurations in which we only need n rounds. For example, when
the induced graph of the initial network is the null graph.
By Proposition 3, starting from any strategy profile of a SUM-CG it converges to a NE.
Therefore, there is always at least one NE.
To obtain a NE we need at most 2|V | rounds, where in each round its executed a BR. Since
executing the BR is polynomial the overall execution 2|V | times BR is also polynomial time.
Corollary 2. There always exists a NE of a given SUM-CG.
Corollary 3. The problem of computing a NE of a given SUM-CG is polynomial time
solvable.
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4 Dynamics in Max Celebrity Games
for β = 1
In this section we are going to study the same questions as in the case of Sum. That is
to say, the computational time to decide if a strategy profile is NE and determine if cycles
are possible, together with the study of defining a dynamics that reaches NE in reasonable
computation time.
By Proposition 10 of [5] we have the following result:
Proposition 4. The problem of computing a Best Response of a player u to a strategy
profile in MAX-CG is polynomial time solvable.
Corollary 4. The problem of deciding whether a given strategy profile is a NE in MAX-CG
is polynomial time computable.
The proof of the previous corollary is analogous to Corollary 1.
In this case we are going to proof that the Sum and Max models have a different behavior,
since in this last case cycles are possible in the Best Response dynamics.
Proposition 5. There exists an initial configuration and a turn policy for which the Best
Response MAX-CG dynamics cycles when |V | ≥ 3.
Proof. We give an example where this situation occurs. Since each strategy profile uniquely
determines a directed graph where each arc (u, v) indicates that u has bought a link to v,
we use this form to represent the cycle of the dynamics. The initial graph has three nodes,
V = {0, 1, 2} with w0 = 7, w1 = 6 and w2 = 5. In addition, α = 4.
Initially we have S(0)1 = {0} and S(0)0 = S(0)2 = ∅.
Figure 4.1: Initial configuration, S(0)
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Because the example has few nodes it is easy to verify that each step is the a Best Response.
The turn policy selects the agents in decreasing order of weight. Therefore, the order of
the nodes will be: 0, 1, 2, 0, ...
S(1) S(2) S(3)
Figure 4.2: First three steps
• Step 0-1 : given that node 1 has bought an edge to node 0 it can improve the cost
by buying the remaining edge. It will decrease the cost from c0(S(0)) = w2 = 5 to
c0(S(1)) = α = 4.
• Step 1-2 : node 1 deletes its initial edge. The cost goes from c1(S(1)) = w2 + α =
5 + 4 = 9 to c1(S(2)) = w0 = 7.
• Step 2-3 : a situation similar to the first one occurs. Node 2 takes advantage of the
fact that buying the remaining edge can reduce the cost from c2(S(2)) = w1 = 6 to
c2(S(3)) = α = 4.
As we can see, there is a cyclic process in which a node buys a link since it only has a
non-adjacent node and then the node that initially had the link deletes it.
S(4) S(5) S(6) = S(0)
Figure 4.3: Last three steps
This pattern repeats itself and after S(6) the next round will be for the node 0, producing
as a result S(1) and therefore, a cycle.
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We have seen an example for the specific case of |V | = 3, let us generalize the structure of
the initial configuration to a configuration with K > 3 nodes.
Consider the game Γ =< V, (wu)u∈V , α, 1 >, where
• V = {0, 1, 2} ∪ {a1, ..., aK−3}, where {0, 1, 2} are the nodes used before and ai are
the auxiliary nodes in order to have |V | = K.
• Define wi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} as before and waj = 12 for j ∈ {1, ..., K − 3}.
• α = 4.
As none of the nodes i ∈ {0, 1, 2} have incentive to buy a link to aj with j ∈ {1, ..., K−3},
we obtain obtain a cycle when the turn policy is 0, 1, 2, 0, ...
This cause the cycle to continue to occur for |V | ≥ 3.
Proposition 6. ∀i ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ V S(i)u ⊆ S(i+1)u in the Best Response MAX-CG dynamics
when S(0) = (∅, ..., ∅).
Proof. We use strong induction on i ≥ 0. The base case is true since for i = 0 and an
arbitrary node u ∈ V we have S(0)u = ∅, and therefore ∅ = S(0)u ⊆ S(1)u .
Inductive hypothesis: Let k ≥ 0 and assume that for j, 0 ≤ j ≤ k it holds ∀u ∈ V : S(j)u ⊆
S(j+1)u .
Let us show that for any arbitrary u ∈ V : S(k+1)u ⊆ S(k+2)u .
If S(k+1)u = ∅ =⇒ ∅ = S(k+1)u ⊆ S(k+2)u as in the base case.
If at round k + 1 is not the turn of player u then S(k+1)u = S(k+2)u which trivially implies
S(k+1)u ⊆ S(k+2)u .
Otherwise, ∃j ∈ {0, ..., k} such that at round j the player u updated his strategy to
S(j+1)u . Let j be the last round that the node changed its strategy, in this way we have
S(k+1)u = S(j+1)u .
By Proposition 10 of [5] we know that the Best Response of a player u at round t can be
computed by defining Y (t)u = {v 6= u | u /∈ S(t)v } and assuming w.l.o.g Y (t)u = {y(t)1 , ..., y(t)rt }
with w
y
(t)
1
≥ ... ≥ w
y
(t)
rt
. Then, for each l ≤ rt, the strategy of cardinality l that minimize cu
is {y(t)1 , ..., y(t)l }. Finally, the Best Response can be computed by finding the l ∈ {0, ..., rt}
such that minimize αl + w
y
(t)
l+1
, assuming w(t)yrt+1 = 0. We make this assumption because
node u would have purchased all non-adjacent nodes and therefore there will be no nodes
at a greater distance than the critical distance.
We define a canonical order in order to ensure that we always get the same result in case
that there is more than one possible Best Response. In the case of a weight tie, we select
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by increasing order of label, that is y(t)i < y
(t)
i+1 if wy(t)i = wy(t)i+1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., rt − 1} and in
the case of multiple possible l, we choose the smallest one.
By inductive hypothesis we have
Y (j)u = {v 6= u | u /∈ S(j)v } ⊇ {v 6= u | u /∈ S(k+1)v } = Y (k+1)u , since j < k + 1
In addition, as no node v ∈ S(j+1)u will buy a link to u in rounds j + 1,...,k, we have that
Y (k+1)u ⊇ S(j+1)u since this edge already exists, and therefore buying a link would not be
Best Response.
At any iteration t the Best Response uses the canonical order to sort the nodes from Y (t)u
and selects its first |S(t+1)u | consecutive nodes in increasing order as the new strategy for
player u. Using that Y (j)u ⊇ Y (k+1)u ⊇ S(j+1)u and defining q = |S(j+1)u | we have,
y
(j)
1 = y
(k+1)
1 , ..., y
(j)
q = y(k+1)q (4.1)
In other words, the first q nodes in Y (j)u are also the first in Y (k+1)u , applying in both
situations the canonical order.
We consider several cases depending on the value of l = |S(k+2)u |.
1. l ≥ q. The Best Response in round k + 1 selects at least the first q nodes of Y (k+1)u
in the canonical order. As the first q elements are precisely the elements of S(j+1)u we
have S(k+2)u ⊇ S(j+1)u = S(k+1)u
2. l < q. Since the response policy of the node u at round j is a Best Response and it
chooses the smallest cardinal set in case of a tie, we have that
αl + w
y
(j)
l+1
> αq + w
y
(j)
q+1
(4.2)
In the round k + 1 the node u has selected as Best Response the set of nodes S(k+2)u
so that the cost of player u now becomes αl + w
y
(k+1)
l+1
.
By Best Response and canonical order we have,
αl + w
y
(k+1)
l+1
≤ αq + w
y
(k+1)
q+1
By (4.1) we have y(j)l+1 = y
(k+1)
l+1 and by Y (j)u ⊇ Y (k+1)u and canonical order we have
w
y
(j)
q+1
≥ w
y
(k+1)
q+1
.
Therefore, αl+w
y
(j)
l+1
= αl+w
y
(k+1)
l+1
≤ αq+w
y
(k+1)
q+1
≤ αq+w
y
(j)
q+1
. Contradiction with
expression (4.2).
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Round j+1 Round k+2
Figure 4.4: Visual representation of Y (j), Y (k+1) and the respective Best Responses
Although the Best Response MAX-CG dynamics allows cycles we are going to see that we
can obtain a NE with a reasonable computational time.
Corollary 5. Best Response MAX-CG dynamics and turn policy by enumeration of nodes
converges to a NE in O(|V |3) rounds when S(0) = (∅, ..., ∅).
Proof. In the worst case, after |V | rounds the number of edges is increased by 1. There
are O(|V |2) edges and we need |V | rounds for each. Therefore, O(|V |3) rounds in total.
As the BR is polynomial time solvable the overall execution is also polynomial time.
Corollary 6. There always exists a NE of a given MAX-CG.
Corollary 7. The problem of computing a NE of a given MAX-CG is polynomial time
solvable.
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5 Dynamics in Celebrity Games for
β > 1
Since the problem of computing a Best Response for β >1 in Sum and Max is NP-hard we
are going to study if we can obtain cycles by applying a Better Response policy for any β
and α. This response policy is much more flexible, but it might also be the case that we
have to examine an exponential number of configurations.
Prior to this result, A`lvarez & Messegue´ showed in [8] that the Better Response dynamics
admits cycles for β = 3 and β = 5 for the Sum and Max models, respectively. In this case
we are going to generalize for any β > 1 and any α > 0.
Proposition 7. ∀β > 1,∀α > 0 there exists an initial configuration and a turn policy for
which the Better Response SUM-CG dynamics have cycles.
Proof. We give a network which induces a Better Response cycle for any β > 1 and any
α > 0. Together with the network, we provide the inequalities that have to be satisfied in
order to produce the cycle. Finally, we provide a solution to the inequalities where weights
are a function of an arbitrary α.
Let Γ = 〈{0, 1, 2, 3}, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be the SUM-CG and let the turn policy be: 2, 3, 2, 3,
...
Figure 5.1: Initial network, S(0)
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S(1) S(2) S(3)
Figure 5.2: The steps of a Better Response cycle for SUM, S(4) = S(0)
• Step 0-1 : c2(S(0)) = w0 + w1 + w3 > 2α = c2(S(1)). Initially, the cost of node 2 is
the sum of the weights of the rest of nodes, since is completely isolated. When node
2 buys a link to node 3 and 0 then it only has to pay the cost of the links, as it has
all nodes at distance at most 2. Since β > 1 the distances does not exceed β.
• Step 1-2 : c3(S(1)) = 2α > w1 = c3(S(2)). Node 3 delete the links and goes from
having a cost of 2α to only pay the weight of node 1, since β > 1 and dG[S(2)](3, 0) = 2.
• Step 2-3 : 2α + w1 > w0 + w1 + w3 ⇐⇒ c2(S(2)) = 2α > w0 + w3 = c2(S(3)). Node
2 goes from paying the cost of two links and the weight of node 1 to pay the weight
of the rest of nodes.
• Step 3-4 : w0 + w1 + w2 > 2α + w2 ⇐⇒ c3(S(3)) = w0 + w1 > 2α = c3(S(4)). Node
3 goes from paying the weight of the rest of nodes to pay the weight of node 2 and
two links.
Let us note that the β > 1 parameter has been taken into account for the calculation
of each of the costs. Since either the nodes are disconnected or if they are in the same
connected component the distance is at most 2.
A possible solution for an arbitrary α:
w0 =
3
2α, w1 = α, w2 = α, w3 =
1
3α
Proposition 8. ∀β > 1,∀α > 0 there exists an initial configuration and a turn policy for
which the Better Response MAX-CG dynamics have cycles.
Proof. We follow the same procedure used in the Proposition 7, in addition to use the same
example.
Let Γ = 〈{0, 1, 2, 3}, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be the MAX-CG. Initially we consider that w0 > w1 >
w2 > w3. Let the turn policy be: 2, 3, 2, 3, ...
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The reasoning is analogous to the one used before but in this taking into account that we
are in MAX-CG. Instead of computing the sum of the weight we compute the max.
• Step 0-1 : c2(S(0)) = w0 > 2α = c2(S(1)).
• Step 1-2 : c3(S(1)) = 2α > w1 = c3(S(2)).
• Step 2-3 : c2(S(2)) = 2α + w1 > w0 = c2(S(3)).
• Step 3-0 : c3(S(3)) = w0 > 2α + w2 = c3(S(4)).
As before, let us note that the β > 1 parameter has been taken into account for the
calculation of each of the costs.
A possible solution for an arbitrary α:
w0 = 3α, w1 =
3
2α, w2 =
1
2α, w3 = α
We have observed that in both cases Better Response cycles are possible.
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6 Experimental Results for β > 1
6.1 Experimental Setup
It is well-known that computing a Best Response of Celebrity Games when β ≥ 2 is NP-
hard. Since agents cannot afford exponential time to perfom the change of strategy, we are
going to explore the greedy model in which a Best Response is polynomial time solvable.
The Best Response in this case will consist in analyzing the best edge-addition, edge-swap
and edge-delete. Then, the strategy is updated if with one of these changes we obtain
a lower cost. In the case of ties, we prioritize the delete, then the swap and finally the
addition.
We consider two turn policies: the random policy, where the node is selected randomly in
each round, and the max cost policy, in which we are giving the turn in decreasing order
of cost.
We consider two possible initial graphs: depending on whether the number of edges is fixed
or not. In both cases we do not allow multi-edges. The generation of the graph in the first
case consists of crossing all the combinations of two nodes without repetition and then
randomly deciding the existence of the edge and its owner. In the second case, we select
two nodes randomly and check whether they are different and there is no edge between
them, in this case we add it. We repeat this process until m edges have been added.
The study of the impact of the initial topology is made through three types of topologies:
random, rl (random line) and dl (directed line). In the random, we generate a graph with
n vertices and n − 1 edges. In the rl, we first generate a path of n nodes and then we
choose the owner of each edge in a random way. On the other hand, in the dl the path
is generated in the same way but the directions are chosen so that all edges point in the
same direction.
For each one of the parameter configurations we run a total of 50 executions, unless oth-
erwise indicated.
In each experiment we analyze:
• Average and maximum steps until converge. We refer to these functions as avg-steps
and max-steps, respectively.
• Diameters, comparing with the theoretical results of NE in Celebrity Games.
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• Maximum ratio between social cost and optimal social cost of the Greedy Equilib-
rium. We refer as rSUM−GE and rMAX−GE to that ratio of the Sum Greedy CG and
Max Greedy CG, respectively. Each of these ratios is compared with the PoA of the
respective model in Celebrity Games.
6.2 Experimental study of Dynamics in Sum Greedy
Celebrity Games
It is natural to think of experimenting with weights as a function of α. We are going to
experiment with different weight distributions that we consider to be representative.
In our experiments we consider the following scenarios:
• n ≤ 35 when the weights are the same and n ≤ 25, otherwise. The reason is
computational limits.
• – All weights are identical w and are related to α as follows: w = kα for k = 1,
k < 1 and k > 1. In this way we explore the different possibilities. We use
k = 20 since A`lvarez et al. [3] showed that if there are more than one node u
such that α > w(n− 1) then In was the only NE, otherwise STn was NE of Γ.
– The other possibility is that there are different types of weights:: T1, T2, T3 or
T4, where:
∗ T1: There is one node more important than the rest. We use as weight of
the important node w = 20α and for the rest w = α.
∗ T2: There are three types of nodes with approximately the same amount in
each. The three possible weights are: w = 20α, w = α and w = α/20.
∗ T3: The weights are distributed equidistant between wmin = α/20 and
wmax = α.
∗ T4: The weights are distributed equidistant between wmin = α/20 and
wmax = 20α.
With T3 and T4 we will analyze the impact of the distance between wmin
and wmax.
• β parameter: β = 2 or β > 2 with: β = n/2, β = n/3.5 and β = n/5. We choose
these possibilities because they are the most representative for the n we test.
• Initial edge density: m = 0, m = n and m = 4n.
• Initial topology: random, rl or dl.
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As the weights we are going to study are in function of α we can prove the following
property.
Proposition 9. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 and Γ′ = 〈V, (wu/λ)u∈V , α/λ, β〉 with λ > 0
be SUM-CG and let cΓu and cΓ
′
u the cost function of player u in Γ and Γ′, respectively.
Then, for any strategy profile S, any player u and any Su, S ′u strategies of u we have that
cΓ
′
u (S−u, S ′u)− cΓ′u (S−u, Su) = (cΓu(S−u, S ′u)− cΓu(S−u, Su))/λ
Proof. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a Sum Celebrity Game, S = (S−u, Su) ∈ S(Γ),
Su, S
′
u ∈ S(u) and S ′ = (S−u, S ′u).
Let Γ′ = 〈V, (wu/λ)u∈V , α/λ, β〉 with λ > 0. Let us show that the deviation of cost of the
same player u and same strategy change is proportional to λ,
cΓ
′
u (S ′)− cΓ
′
u (S) =
= α
λ
|S ′u|+
∑
{v | dG[S′](u,v)>β}
wv
λ
−
α
λ
|Su|+
∑
{v | dG[S](u,v)>β}
wv
λ
 =
= 1
λ
α|S ′u|+ ∑
{v | dG[S′](u,v)>β}
wv −
α|Su|+ ∑
{v | dG[S](u,v)>β}
wv
 =
= c
Γ
u(S ′)− cΓu(S)
λ
• Hence, by Proposition 9, regarding the behaviour and the evolution of any dynamics
we can assume w.l.o.g that α is fixed so we must only address the multiple scenarios
given by distinct weights of the players. Let α = 100.
We separate the study between β = 2 and β > 2 and discuss similarities and differences
between the case in which the weights are equal and in which they are different.
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6.2.1 β = 2
The results obtained in the study of the relation between w and α together with the
variation of the number of initial nodes can be found in the following figure.
Figure 6.1: Experimental results for the Sum Greedy CG. Avg-steps, 50 trials
In the total of all the experiments with equal weights there are approximately 83% of
deletions, 11% of swaps and 6% of additions. Usually the additions are made in early
phases in which the diameter of the graph is reduced, once the nodes are close there is a
phase of elimination of redundant links. Swaps are usually used in both phases. When the
weights are different, the most used operator is still the delete but the swap becomes more
important. In this case the proportion is 60% of deletions, 25% swaps and 15% additions.
This is due to the fact that initially the links to lower weight nodes will be exchanged for
links to higher weight nodes, taking into account the neighbors of each of them since β = 2.
It is observed how the main factor of the time of converge is the number of initial edges.
When we do not fix the initial number of links, the expected number is O(n2), and we can
see that quadratic tendency in the number of steps. On the other hand, when we establish
the number of edges linear with n, this tendency is also linear. In addition, the necessary
steps for m = 4n are greater than for m = n and the same behavior between m = n and
m = 0. Although the main factor is the one mentioned above, we can also observe how
the max cost policy is the one that more frequently takes longer to converge comparing
the same setting with the random policy. This tendency is maintained in experiments with
different weights. Even though, in this case it seems to influence more the distribution of
weights than the turn policy. This may be because heavier nodes guide the convergence
process more clearly.
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When we do not fix the number of initial edges or m = 4n then the relation w = α is the
slowest. This is due to the fact that a large number of swaps are effected even if they end
up converging on the star graph. These swaps slow down the convergence process. When
m = n or m = 0 the slowest one is when w = 20α. This is because it is cheaper to buy a
link than to pay the weight of a node and large amount of additions are performed. When
m = 0, the nodes are going to buy a link forming directly a star graph. In the case that
m = n, we observe mainly a first phase of additions and swaps and then there is a second
phase with mainly deletions reaching the star graph or at least a graph with diameter 2,
as we expected because β = 2.
We have explored different weights for n ≤ 25. We have observed in this case a fast
convergence. Due to this different weight, at the beginning of the process the heavy nodes
will have more links, in this way, the central nodes are better defined. The configurations
that take longer are those that the weights are equidistant. This seems to be because the
nodes swap links to higher weight nodes, but, as the higher weight nodes produce their
changes then the previous nodes have to change again.
We have obtained along all the configurations and different n three diameters: 2, 3 or ∞,
for equal and different weights. This matched the theoretical result of Nash equilibrium in
which if the resulting graph was connected then diam(G) ≤ 2β+ 1. In addition, all graphs
with infinity diameter have resulted in null graphs.
When the weights are identical, the infinite diameter is obtained in configurations where
m = 0 and w = α or w = α/20. Both cases were expected. Since when w = α the networks
starts from the null graph and the cost of a link is the same that the weight of a node no
one will have incentive to buy. In the second case, as a link is profitable only in the case
it approach at least 20 nodes it was expected given the n we tested. When weights are
different we obtain infinite when m = 0 and w = T3, this distribution of weights is the
only one that presents wmax ≤ α. This means that no node has an incentive to buy unless
it gets closer to more than one node. As with m = 0 this cannot happen we get In.
As we know, the PoA of a SUM-CG when the NE graph is connected is O(min{n
β
, W
α
}),
so PoA is proportional to n.
In this case we get that rSUM−GE of networks that are not In have been:
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Figure 6.2: Experimental results for the Sum Greedy CG. Same and different weights.
rSUM−GE of all greedy equilibria that are not In
We observe again how the ratio is linear with respect to n, which confirms that the equi-
librium moves away from the optimum as the number of nodes increase.
Networks in which the independent set is the resulting graph can be analyzed analytically.
We do the study with equal weights:
• w = α, C(S)
OPT (Γ) =
n(n−1)w
min{α,n·w}(n−1) =
n(n−1)w
min{w,n·w}(n−1) =
n(n−1)w
w(n−1) = n
• w = α/20, C(S)
OPT (Γ) =
n(n−1)w
min{α,n·w}(n−1) =
n(n−1)w
min{20w,n·w}(n−1)
If n ≤ 20, n(n−1)w
n·w(n−1) = 1
If n > 20, n(n−1)w20w(n−1) =
n
20
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For the study of the topology we initially executed 50 times each configuration but we
obtained that the rl, w = 20α, random function had a peak at n = 15. The reason for this
slow convergence was because the equilibrium was a star graph but in the intermediate
process there were several nodes candidates to be the center of the star. This negatively
affected convergence since there were more swaps and later deletes. To analyze if it was a
configuration pathology or it was because of the random policy, we executed 1000 times
each configuration, obtaining the following figure:
Figure 6.3: Experimental results for the Sum Greedy CG. Avg-steps, 1000 trials
It can be observed how all functions tend to grow linearly with the number of nodes and
in this case we have not observed any strange peaks.
As we have seen before, the configuration of weights that took the longest to converge with
m = n was with w = 20α. In this case, once again, this is the configuration that takes the
longest.
In the case of different weights, we could expect that the center of the star, if produced,
would be the node (or one of the nodes) of higher weight. Through our observations we
have been able to verify that in most cases the heaviest node does not end up as the
center of the star. Analyzing the traces we can observe how the main reason might be
the turn policy, since nodes with lower weight due to the initial position in the network
can accumulate more links. As for convergence time, similar values are obtained but with
greater oscillations.
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6.2.2 β > 2
So far we have made the study for β = 2. In this case we are going to reproduce the
previous experiments but varying β in function of n. As we know 1 ≤ β ≤ n− 1, for that
reason we are going to use values of the form n/k, where k > 1. It has been taken into
account that in the cost function β is equivalent to bβc in order to correctly distribute the
possible values.
The studied values of β are n/2, n/3.5 and n/5. The relation between w and α is the same
as in previous experiments.
Figure 6.4: Experimental results for the Sum Greedy CG. Random initial graph. Avg-steps,
50 trials
Again, there is a tendency similar to the one obtained previously. The number of steps
is mainly determined by the number of edges in the initial graph. In addition, the same
behavior occurs when the configuration sets the number of initial edges.
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Figure 6.5: Experimental results for the Sum Greedy CG. The initial topology of the graph
is random, rl or dl. Average number of steps needed to converge of 50 trials
For the case of the initial topology, β variation does affect the number of steps as can
be seen in the figure below. In the case of different weights the behavior is similar. The
configurations that tend to increase more than the rest are those with w = α/20, that
is, w < α. In this case, a node will buy a link if, at a minimum, approach 20 nodes at
a distance of at least β. This is more frequent as the number of nodes increases and as
we increase the value of β since the number of nodes that must be approached to make it
profitable remains constant. For this reason, more additions are produced and the number
of steps required is higher.
We analyze the trace of dl, w = α/20, β = n/2 with random turn policy to show the
behavior. We use the case n = 25 to be able to display the nodes correctly.
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S(20) S(21)
Figure 6.6: Trace of: dl, w = α/20, β = n/2 random with n = 25
We can see how in the transition from S(20) to S(21) the node 19 has removed the link and
has formed two connected components. This node has removed the link because it only
approached 11 nodes, so removing the link has improved since w = α/20. For example,
if the turn in state 20 had been for 5, a similar situation would have happened. On the
other hand, in the early stages when a node generates several connected components it
usually forms a component with few nodes that, in case it is the turn of one of them, it will
swap in order to reconnect to the connected component with more nodes. As the process
progresses, it is more likely that several components will be formed in which due to the
cost of the link it will not be profitable to rejoin them. From this moment on, the network
would start to carry out deletes until reaching the independent set.
These behavior also occurs for the max cost policy with w = α/20. The reason is similar
to the one mentioned above, but in this case all the equilibria end up being In. This is
because the random allows more options of reconnection of the connected components that
are formed.
In the case of different weights, the time of convergence show no apparent difference.
Curiously, the case in which the convergence time is slower is due to the configuration of
weights in which there is a more relevant node than the rest. In this configuration we get
the following graph at equilibrium:
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Figure 6.7: T1, β = 5, n = 25
The reason for having a few additional steps is because the heaviest node (node 0) is in
a leaf. In this way, small modifications of his connections forced to restructure multiple
connections.
Among all the configurations tested with β > 1, we obtain that approximately 90% of
the times the experiment with greater β converges faster. This is intuitively understood
because with higher β the nodes need less number of links to approach a number of nodes
and, as we have seen, the time of convergence is closely related to the number of links.
The diameters of the graphs still satisfy the property of the diameters of the Nash equilib-
rium.
In addition, rSUM−GE decreases when n increases because β also increase. In the case of
greedy equilibria that are not In we have:
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Figure 6.8: Experimental results for the Sum Greedy CG. rSUM−GE of all greedy equilibria
that are not In
Further remarks In all the experiments done for β = 2 the configurations have con-
verged. Theoretically it is proven in the proposition 7 the existence of cycles in the Better
Response SUM-CG dynamics and in [8] that the greedy model we analyze admits cycles.
This indicates that, at least, these situations are uncommon.
We have observed how the determining factor of the steps needed is the number of initial
edges, the greater the number of edges the greater the time needed.
It is observed how the greedy equilibria, despite being a super-set of the NE, preserves
the properties of the maximum ratio between social cost and optimum social cost and the
possible diameters of the equilibrium graphs.
In addition, when we have different weights we have observed a lower avg-steps but in
the case of max-steps there are higher oscillations. This is due to the fact that the nodes
that will concentrate the highest density of links are better defined. Even though, we can
observe specific cases in which the initial network negatively affects the heavier nodes that
should concentrate links and this causes a considerable slowdown.
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6.3 Experimental study of Dynamics in Max Greedy
Celebrity Games
In this section we analyze the same experiments we have done for the previous model but
for the Max. In this case, we re-establish what our relation between w and α are according
to the new cost function we are dealing with.
If we start from the independent set and the weights are the equal, the only way for a
node to buy links will be that it buys all of them. Otherwise, the node would increase
its cost because it continues to pay the weight of some node to which is not adjacent and
also pay the cost of the links. In this case, the relation between α and w that keeps the
cost identical is when w = (n − 1)α. Again, we are going to analyze a wider range of
possibilities by multiplying by a factor greater and smaller than 1.
We consider the following scenarios:
• n ≤ 35 when the weights are the same and n ≤ 25, otherwise. The reason is
computational limits.
• – All weight are identical w and are related to α as follows: w = k(n − 1)α for
k = 1, k < 1 and k > 1. We choose k = 20 to maintain the previously used
constant.
– The other possibility is that there are different types of weights: T1, T2, T3 or
T4, where:
∗ T1: There is one node more important than the rest. We use as weight of
the important node w = 20(n− 1)α and for the rest w = (n− 1)α.
∗ T2: There are three types of nodes with approximately the same amount in
each. The three possible weights are: w = 20(n − 1)α, w = (n − 1)α and
w = (n− 1)α/20.
∗ T3: The weights are distributed equidistant between wmin = (n − 1)α/20
and wmax = (n− 1)α.
∗ T4: The weights are distributed equidistant between wmin = (n − 1)α/20
and wmax = 20(n− 1)α.
• β parameter: β = 2 or β > 2 with: β = n/2, β = n/3.5 and β = n/5.
• Initial edge density: m = 0, m = n and m = 4n.
• Initial topology: random, rl or dl.
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As the weights we are going to study are in function of alpha we can prove the following
property.
Proposition 10. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 and Γ′ = 〈V, (wu/λ)u∈V , α/λ, β〉 with λ > 0
be MAX-CG and let cΓu and cΓ
′
u the cost function of player u in Γ and Γ′, respectively.
Then, for any strategy profile S, any player u and any Su, S ′u strategies of u we have that
cΓ
′
u (S−u, S ′u)− cΓ′u (S−u, Su) = (cΓu(S−u, S ′u)− cΓu(S−u, Su))/λ
Proof. Let Γ = 〈V, (wu)u∈V , α, β〉 be a Max Celebrity Game, S = (S−u, Su) ∈ S(Γ),
Su, S
′
u ∈ S(u) and S ′ = (S−u, S ′u).
Let Γ′ = 〈V, (wu/λ)u∈V , α/λ, β〉 with λ > 0. Let us show that the deviation of cost of the
same player u and same strategy change is proportional to λ,
cΓ
′
u (S ′)− cΓ
′
u (S) =
= α
λ
|S ′u|+ max{v | dG[S′](u,v)>β}
wv
λ
−
α
λ
|Su|+ max{v | dG[S](u,v)>β}
wv
λ
 =
= 1
λ
α|S ′u|+ max{v | dG[S′](u,v)>β}wv −
α|Su|+ max{v | dG[S](u,v)>β}wv
 =
= c
Γ
u(S ′)− cΓu(S)
λ
• Hence, by Proposition 10, regarding the behaviour and the evolution of any dynamics
we can assume w.l.o.g that α is fixed so we must only address the multiple scenarios
given by distinct weights of the players. Let α = 100.
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6.3.1 β = 2
The results obtained in the study of the ratio of weight and alpha together with the
variation of the number of initial nodes can be found in the following figure.
Figure 6.9: Experimental results for the Max Greedy CG. Max-steps, 50 trials
We have included the plot of max-steps since in the case of the average we get something
similar to the Sum model: the configurations converge slower as more edges they initially
have. Even though, in this model the different settings do not follow such a clear trend,
aspect that can be observed clearly in n = 25. On the other hand, this distinction is clearly
present in the average plot.
Again, the configurations with greater convergence time are those in which α < w, those
configurations are: w = (n− 1)α and w = 20(n− 1)α. In this way nodes have incentive to
buy links.
When we use different weights, the configurations that take longer to converge are those
that there are different types of weight and in the initial phase is formed as the center of a
possible star a node of weight significantly lower than the maximum weight. This causes
that if a heavy node begins to concentrate link density there is a transition process that
will involve a large number of steps. As n increases, it will be less likely that a low weight
node concentrate a large number of links, making this behavior less common.
For the same weights or different weights, max cost turn requires more steps to converge.
Furthermore, as the number of nodes decreases random and max cost are equaled.
We include a trace of the configuration with a peak in n = 25.
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S(400) S(458)
Figure 6.10: Trace of: m = 4n, w = (n− 1)α, max cost with n = 25
Analyzing the behavior in general, it is observed how the apparent reason of the peak of
steps is due to the fact that there is not a single node as the center of the star and, due
to the politics of the turn this problem is accentuated. Since there are several candidates
for the center, transitions will be made between different nodes until the process reaches
its equilibrium.
The proportion of additions, deletions and swaps used in this version has varied with respect
to the previous version. In this case the deletions have been reduced to approximately 71%
and the swaps increased to 25%, leaving the additions at 4%. Therefore, additions are
less used than before. The increment of swaps might indicates that this version is more
susceptible to slower convergence and possible configurations with more variable steps.
When the weights are different the percentage loss of deletions is even more accentuated
by considerably increasing the additions. The percentages are 55% deletes, 30% swaps
and 15% additions. This is due to the fact that there are cases in which it is profitable to
connect to the heaviest node to which you are not connected even paying the maximum of
the remaining weights. This happens when there are nodes with very high weight compared
to the rest.
When weights are equal in all configurations, we have obtained again three diameters
exactly the same as in the previous version: 2, 3 and∞. On the other hand, when we have
different weights we also obtain graphs with diameter 4. Theoretically it is established that
NE have diam(G) ≤ 2β + 2, so again, we get that greedy equilibria fulfill this property of
NE.
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Figure 6.11: Example of diam(G) = 4. Configuration: m = n, T1, random with n = 25
In this case the heaviest node is 0. We observe how the rest of the nodes are at a distance
of at most 2 from the heaviest node and the diameter is 4.
In the study of the topology we have carried out the same procedure as in the previous
version.
Figure 6.12: Experimental results for the Max Greedy CG. Avg-steps, 50 trials
In this occasion we observe a strange behavior, in which for n = 10 there are some configu-
rations with a peak and that starting from n = 15 all converge directly to the independent
53
set applying only deletion operators.
S(4) S(5) S(6)
Figure 6.13: Trace of: random, w = 20(n− 1)α, max cost with n = 10
In this trace we can observe that node 9 is at a distance at most 2 of the rest, on the
other hand, the rest of the nodes are at a greater distance due to node 2, 5 and 7. As a
consequence the node 7 remove the link, since the cost of the link does not prevent it from
paying w due to β = 2. In this case, the central node buys a link to node 7 since α < w.
As we can see this situation is unlikely to occur as n increases, since the only way this
happens is that buying a single link a node gets to have the rest at a distance at most β.
Figure 6.14: Experimental results for the Max Greedy CG. Avg-steps, 50 trials
On the other hand, with different types of weights the behavior is completely different.
The configurations in which more steps are required are those in which there are nodes
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with weight much higher than α. In these cases the network will be connected and in
addition different nodes can enter in dispute for the density of links either for their weight
or for being better connected.
Figure 6.15: Experimental results for the Max Greedy CG, same weights. rMAX−GE of all
greedy equilibria that are not In
With different weights rMAX−GE also increases as n increases because β also increases.
Theoretically we have that the price of anarchy of MAX-CG is PoA ≤ 2(wmax/α) and
PoA(Γ) = O(n/β). As we can see, in networks where the independent set is not the
final graph the PoA first presents a decrease and then an increase as the number of nodes
increases. Even though, these two expressions are still satisfied for all configurations.
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6.3.2 β > 2
For sake of presentation the plot only contain the results when the graph has no number
of fixed initial edges.
Figure 6.16: Experimental results for the Max Greedy CG. Random initial graph. Avg-
steps, 50 trials
We are still getting the same results as before but this time it seems that when β is linearly
related to n the avg-steps function is smoother. With different weights the behavior is the
same as with equal weights.
We are going to analyze the initial topology. In the Sum version there were cases in which
the number of steps increased considerably. On this occasion due to the nature of the
maximum we hope that there are also these peaks.
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Figure 6.17: Experimental results for the Max Greedy CG. The initial topology of the
graph is random, rl or dl. Average number of steps needed to converge of 50 trials
It is interesting to see that there is no configuration that stands out from the rest. Con-
trasting with this, we can observe that the necessary steps vary considerably. Even though,
through the avg-steps can be observed how the trend is still linear with respect to n. With
different weights the avg-steps behaves in a similar way, but in max-steps there are more
oscillations. This is due to the same reason there were oscillations with β = 2.
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Figure 6.18: Experimental results for the Max Greedy CG. rMAX−GE of all greedy equilibria
that are not In
On this occasion rMAX−GE it also decreases as we increase β. On this occasion the decrease
is more abrupt reaching a minimum of approximately 1.15. When we use different weights
there is also a tendency to lower the ratio.
Further remarks We have not found any cycle in any of the executions. In addition,
the properties of the maximum ratio between social cost and optimum social cost as well
as the diameter with respect to the theoretical properties of NE continue to be satisfied.
On this occasion, we have observed that different weights cause different behaviors com-
pared to equal weights. This is due to the interaction between the heavy nodes and the
nodes that accumulate more links. In addition, with different weights the network may
take longer to converge if the node concentrating the highest density of links is not one of
the heaviest nodes.
58
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The main objective of this project was to analyze the dynamics of Celebrity Games in
order to understand better how decentralized and selfish networks without coordination
among agents behave. Since agents act selfishly it is reasonable to think that they change
their strategy to their best option. For that reason we have studied the Best Response
dynamics.
Since the problem of computing a Best Response of a player is polynomial time solvable
for β = 1 and NP-hard for β > 1, we have divided the research in two parts.
For β = 1, we have shown that for a Best Response Sum Celebrity Games dynamics it is not
possible to obtain cycles and the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium is computable
in polynomial time. On the other hand, for the Max model there is an initial configuration
and turn policy that presents cycles but computing a Nash equilibrium is still polynomial
time.
For β >1, since agents cannot afford exponential time for the response policy we have
analyzed the Better Response. In this case the response is more flexible but it might be
the case that we have to examine an exponential number of configuration. Furthermore,
we have found that for any α and for any β there exist an initial configuration and a turn
policy in which the Better Response dynamics have cycles in both models.
In order to perform an experimental study of a Better Response we have defined a greedy
model, in which the possible new strategies are restricted. The new strategy of a player are
those in which he adds, remove or swaps a link from his current strategy. In this model,
the problem of computing a Best Response is polynomial time.
In the experiments of the Best Response Greedy Celebrity Games we have analyzed the
number of steps rounds to converge. In both versions all tested configurations have con-
verged in O(n2) where n is the number of nodes. This indicates that, despite the possibility
of obtaining cycles, these pathological situations are very rare. In addition, we have ver-
ified that the structural properties obtained theoretically for Celebrity Games also verify
for all the instances tested of the Greedy Celebrity Games. This indicates that, in an
experimental way, the greedy equilibria is not worse in terms of the Price of Anarchy and
that we have not obtained diameters greater than those expected in the Celebrity Games.
For future research, we consider that it would be interesting to analyze a random response
policy, in which the player who has the turn generates a random strategy and makes the
change of strategy if it improves its current cost. This response policy in the worst case will
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need an exponential number of rounds, but it would be interesting to study the expected
time.
As a personal experience, I have been able to develop skills that I would not have been
able to do otherwise. First of all, I had to learn the basic concepts of Game Theory and
Network Creation Games. Furthermore, I had to learn how to read scientific articles and
summarize the main ideas. In addition, I have trained skills gained during the degree such
as complexity theory and programming. Overall, the project has been successful and my
objective of taking part in a research project has been fulfilled.
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A Project Management
A.1 Temporal planning
This section aims to describe the tasks that define the project, its estimated duration and
the dependencies between tasks. In addition, it will explain how possible deviations will
be solved and how it will affect the final duration of the project.
In all the tasks described above, except for the first one, the 3 roles of the project will
participate: project director, PhD assistant and researcher.
We have divided the project into a series of tasks, so that we can identify on a large scale
whether the objectives are being met.
A.1.1 Feasibility and study of concepts
Before deciding on this project, the feasibility and the basic concepts with which it was
necessary to be familiar were analyzed with the project director. During the previous
semester the material has been studied and several meetings have been held to track
progress. The objective of this preliminary study was to focus the time of the project on
the research itself.
As such, we will not count the time invested in this previous phase since it was carried out
outside the project and it is difficult to determine.
A.1.2 Project planning
It can be divided into three sub-stages:
• Context and scope of the project.
• Temporal planning.
• Budget and sustainability.
The first two sub-stages are essential to carry out the project correctly, as otherwise we
could be doing unnecessary work or in a disorganized way. The third sub-stage on the
other hand, due to the characteristics of the project, can be combined with other tasks.
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A.1.3 Main development
This is the main and most important task of the project. It covers the research, experi-
mentation and writing the results of each of the parts.
In Celebrity Games the cost of a player is: the cost of creating the links plus and sum
or max (depending on which model of the game is) of the weights of the agents that are
farther away than the critical distance β.
We divide the project into the following parts:
Research of the Dynamics in Celebrity Games for β = 1
We will explore if the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium is polynomial time, in
addition to studying whether it is possible to obtain cycles in the Best Response dynamics
for both models.
Research of the Dynamics in Celebrity Games for β > 1
As computing a Best Response is NP-hard and agents cannot afford exponential time
to change the strategy, they have to use an approximation of the best possible strategy
change. For that reason, we are going to explore a greedy model in which the possible new
strategies are restricted.
We are also going to explore if cycles are possible in a Better Response Celebrity Games.
Experimentation and result analysis of the Dynamics in Greedy Celebrity
Games for β > 1
In this case we are going to analyze experimentally the greedy model introduced before.
We are going to analyze the time of convergence, that is, the number of rounds needed until
the network reach an equilibrium. In addition, we are going to compare the theoretical
results of Celebrity Games with the greedy model, in order to examine how similar the
equilibria are.
To test the convergence a set of graphs will be generated and its proper analysis will be
done.
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A.1.4 Final stage
At this stage we are going to write the documentation as well as preparing the final pre-
sentation.
Due to the nature of the project special attention is required. Therefore, considerable time
will be devoted to writing, in this way the feedback given by the project manager can be
taken into account.
A.2 Budget
To be able to carry out the project we will need resources. Below we will detail its cost
according to the type of expense it belongs to.
For the calculation of amortization we have taken into account that the amortization time
is 5 months.
A.2.1 Hardware resources
To develop the project we need a computer in which to program the code and perform the
different tasks, either answer e-mails, consult articles, etc.
Product Price Useful life Amortization
PC + peripherals 1200 e 4 years 125e
Total 125e
Table A.1: Hardware budget
A.2.2 Software resources
These are the main programs needed as indicated before. If we need any additional program
we will try to use an open source alternative.
Product Price Useful life Amortization
Windows 10 269 e 3 years 37,36e
LATEX 0 e - 0e
Python (+ libraries) 0 e - 0e
git 0 e - 0e
Total 37,36e
Table A.2: Software budget
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A.2.3 Human resources
We break down the working hours for each task of the project and the role of those involved.
Role TaskProject planning β = 1 β > 1 Experimentation Final stage
Project director 16 h 16 h 16 h 30 h 16 h
PhD Assistant 16 h 16 h 16 h 30 h 16 h
Researcher 90 h 90 h 90 h 130 h 50 h
Total 122 h 122 h 122 h 190 h 82 h
Table A.3: Estimated time per phase
Taking into account the different costs of each role we obtain the following human resources
costs.
Role Total work e/hour Total cost
Project director 94 h 40 3760 e
PhD Assistant 94 h 35 3290 e
Researcher 450 h 25 11250 e
Total 638 h 18300 e
Table A.4: Human resources budget
A.2.4 Unexpected costs
In case of any deviation in the planning we allocate a portion of the budget to possible over-
time needed to complete the project. These hours belong to the margin time contemplated
in the temporary planning.
Role Hours e/hour Total cost
Project director 30 h 40 1200 e
PhD Assistant 30 h 35 1050 e
Researcher 30 h 25 750 e
Total 90 h 3000 e
Table A.5: Unexpected costs
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A.2.5 Indirect cost budget
The average power we will need is approximately 200W. This includes the computer,
lighting and items used from time to time such as the printer.
If we suppose that this is the average consumption, we can calculate that the total energy
consumed will be the average power multiplied by the time we have invested in total, that
is, the time obtained in human resources: 200W · 638h = 127,6 kWh.
Product Price Units Estimated cost
Electricity 0,2 e/kWh 127,6 kWh 25,52 e
Internet 40 e 4 months 160 e
Office supplies 25e 1 25e
Total 210,52 e
Table A.6: Indirect costs
A.2.6 Total budget
Notice that a 10% of contingency has been added over the cumulative total in order to
cover unexpected expenses that may occur during the course of the project.
The final breakdown of costs is presented below:
Concept Estimated cost
Hardware resources 125 e
Software resources 37,36 e
Human resources 18300 e
Unexpected costs 3000 e
Indirect cost 210,52 e
Subtotal 21672,88 e
Contingency (10%) 2167,3 e
Total 23840,18 e
Table A.7: Total cost
A.3 Sustainability
A.3.1 Matrix ponderation
We will ponderate the matrix according to the standard seen in GEP.
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The cells that belong to the development will have values between 0 and 10, instead the
useful life will be from 0 to 20 and the risks from -20 to 0.
The final sum will be -60 to 90, with 90 being the highest possible sustainability score we
can obtain.
Development Exploitation Risks
Environmental Design consumption Ecological footprint Environmental5 20 -5
Economic Invoice Viability plan Economic5 20 -10
Social Personal impact Social impact Social9 20 0
Total 19 60 -1564
Table A.8: Sustainability Matrix
With a sustainability of 64 we can conclude that the project has an adequate sustainability
index.
In the development phase the environmental and economic have been affected by the
possibility of needing more resources than estimated, which would affect the ecological
footprint and the budget. In the exploitation phase we get the maximum score because no
extra resources are needed but the results are public at any time. The possible risks are
the economic since we are not guaranteed to obtain an economic benefit from the project.
In the following, we will look more deeply at each of these parts.
A.3.2 Economical dimension
All costs related to the project have been detailed in the previous section. This description
includes material costs, human resources and also takes into account possible unforeseen
events.
The research generally has the same material needs as those described throughout the
document and the only one that can vary is in the number of participants and their
corresponding costs. In this case, the team carrying out the research is of a reduced size in
which only one person participates for each role. In the case that the research was carried
out by only the project director and his assistant, this would mean an increase in human
costs, since the cost of each one is greater than the one of the researcher, and would also
prevent them from carrying out other work.
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A.3.3 Environmental dimension
The project does not have a major impact on the environment, as the main detrimental
factor is indirect sources, such as the need for electricity and the necessary office supplies,
such as sheets of paper for making notes.
The impact that electricity has on the environment depends on the supplier, as it will not
have the same impact whether it comes from renewable energies or from some other source.
On the other hand the paper also depends on its origin, since it is not the same to use
recycled paper that of another type.
In both cases, every effort will be made to minimize damage to the environment. In
addition, indicate that this impact is common to all research projects.
A.3.4 Social dimension
This project will teach me what it means to be a researcher and help me decide my
professional career.
Once the project is finished society in general will not notice any change, but the scientific
community can use the results obtained for future research. Research similar to this project
requires similar resources to those indicated above. This project will contribute to the study
of a model from a point of view that had not been done before.
In research, apart from some projects with an immediate practical application, it is difficult
to quantify their possible impact. In this case, the study is merely theoretical from which
one can extract certain ideas regarding networking.
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B Code for Simulations
B.1 Sum Celebrity Games
from random import choice, randint, sample
import networkx as nx
import numpy as np
class SCG:
def __init__(self, w, a, B, edges=[]):
self.w = w
self.a = a
self.B = B
self.n = len(w)
self.G = nx.Graph()
self.G.add_nodes_from(range(self.n))
self.G.add_edges_from((u, v, {’owner’: u}) for u, v in edges)
def generate_graph(self):
"""
Generates a graph u.a.r
No self loops nor multiedges
"""
self.G.clear()
self.G.add_nodes_from(range(self.n))
for u in range(self.n):
for v in range(u+1,self.n):
if choice([True,False]):
x,y = sample([u,v],k=2);
self.G.add_edge(x, y, owner=x)
def m_generate_graph(self, m):
"""
Generates a graph u.a.r with ’m’ edges
No self loops nor multiedges
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"""
self.G.clear()
self.G.add_nodes_from(range(self.n))
for _ in range(m):
while True:
u = randint(0, self.n - 1)
v = randint(0, self.n - 1)
if u == v or self.G.has_edge(u, v):
continue
self.G.add_edge(u, v, owner=u)
break
def random_line(self):
self.G.clear()
self.G.add_nodes_from(range(self.n))
rp = np.random.permutation(self.n)
for i in range(len(rp)-1):
if choice([True,False]):
self.G.add_edge(rp[i],rp[i+1],owner=rp[i])
else:
self.G.add_edge(rp[i+1],rp[i],owner=rp[i+1])
def directed_line(self):
self.G.clear()
self.G.add_nodes_from(range(self.n))
rp = np.random.permutation(self.n)
for i in range(len(rp)-1):
self.G.add_edge(rp[i],rp[i+1],owner=rp[i])
def calc_cost(self, u):
return self._calc_cost(u, sum)
def _calc_cost(self, u, func):
dist = nx.single_source_shortest_path_length(self.G, u, self.B)
purchased_edges = 0
weight_no_path = []
for v in self.G.nodes:
if u == v:
continue
if v not in dist: # if not in dist, distance(u,v) > B due
cutoff
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weight_no_path.append(self.w[v])
elif self.G.has_edge(u, v) and self.G[u][v][’owner’] == u: # v
in S_u
purchased_edges += 1
return self.a * purchased_edges + func(weight_no_path)
def is_NE(self):
for u in range(self.n):
br, _ = self.BestResponse(u)
if not br:
return False
return True
def socialcost(self):
sc = 0
for u in range(self.n):
sc += self.calc_cost(u)
return sc
def BestResponse(self, u):
"""
Check if strategy of ’u’ is a BR and if not returns a u.a.r Best
Response
:return: (strategy ’u’ is BR, u.a.r Better Response)
"""
initial_cost = self.calc_cost(u)
initial_edges = [(u, v, {’owner’: u}) for v in self.G.neighbors(u)
if
self.G[u][v][’owner’] == u]
self.G.remove_edges_from(initial_edges)
not_buy_nodes = [v for v in self.G.neighbors(u) if
self.G[u][v][’owner’] == v] + [u]
poss_nodes = [v for v in range(self.n) if v not in not_buy_nodes]
min_cost = initial_cost
BRs = []
for ss in SCG._powerset(poss_nodes):
act_edges = [(u, v, {’owner’: u}) for v in ss]
self.G.add_edges_from(act_edges)
cost = self.calc_cost(u)
self.G.remove_edges_from(act_edges)
if min_cost > cost:
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min_cost = cost
BRs = [ss]
elif cost == min_cost:
BRs.append(ss)
self.G.add_edges_from(initial_edges)
if min_cost == initial_cost:
return True, None
return False, choice(BRs)
"""
GRAPH FUNCTIONS
"""
def add_edges(self, u, nodes):
for v in nodes:
self.G.add_edge(u, v, owner=u)
def del_edges(self, u, nodes):
for v in nodes:
self.G.remove_edge(u, v)
def nod_noadj(self, u):
"""
Nodes not adjacent to ’u’
"""
return [v for v in range(self.n) if v not in self.G.neighbors(u)
and u != v]
def out_edges(self, u):
"""
Nodes to which ’u’ has purchased a link. S_u
"""
res = []
for v in range(self.n):
if self.G.has_edge(u, v) and self.G[u][v][’owner’] == u:
res.append(v)
return res
"""
UTILS
"""
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@staticmethod
def _powerset(s):
x = len(s)
for i in range(1 << x):
yield [s[j] for j in range(x) if (i & (1 << j))]
B.2 Max Celebrity Games
from .SCG import SCG
class MCG(SCG):
def calc_cost(self, u):
return self._calc_cost(u, lambda x: max(x, default=0))
B.3 Greedy Celebrity Games
from random import choice, shuffle
from enum import Enum
from model.SCG import SCG
from model.MCG import MCG
class Policy(Enum):
RANDOM = 0
MAXCST = 1
class Version(Enum):
SUM = 0
MAX = 1
class GreedyCG():
def __init__(self, w, a, B, edges=[], policy=Policy.RANDOM, ver=
Version.SUM):
if Version.SUM == ver:
self.Game = SCG(w, a, B, edges)
else:
self.Game = MCG(w, a, B, edges)
self.policy = policy
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def generate_graph(self):
self.Game.generate_graph()
def m_generate_graph(self, m):
self.Game.m_generate_graph(m)
def random_line(self):
self.Game.random_line()
def directed_line(self):
self.Game.directed_line()
def check_best_add(self, u, current_cost):
return self._check_best_move(u, self.Game.nod_noadj,
self.Game.add_edges,
self.Game.del_edges, current_cost)
def check_best_del(self, u, current_cost):
return self._check_best_move(u, self.Game.out_edges,
self.Game.del_edges,
self.Game.add_edges, current_cost)
def _check_best_move(self, u, get_nodes, func, func_inv, current_cost)
:
nodes_exam = get_nodes(u)
min_cost = current_cost
nodes = []
for v in nodes_exam:
func(u, [v])
c = self.Game.calc_cost(u)
func_inv(u, [v])
if c < min_cost:
min_cost = c
nodes = [v]
elif c == min_cost:
nodes.append(v)
if min_cost == current_cost:
return False, current_cost, None
return True, min_cost, choice(nodes)
def check_best_swp(self, u, current_cost):
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O = self.Game.out_edges(u) # u owns edge to elements of O
N = self.Game.nod_noadj(u) # u not own edge to elements of N
min_cost = current_cost
change = []
for v in O:
for w in N:
self.Game.del_edges(u, [v])
self.Game.add_edges(u, [w])
c = self.Game.calc_cost(u)
self.Game.del_edges(u, [w])
self.Game.add_edges(u, [v])
if c < min_cost:
min_cost = c
change = [(v, w)]
elif c == min_cost:
change.append((v, w))
if min_cost == current_cost:
return False, current_cost, None
return True, min_cost, choice(change)
def perform_local_search_step(self, u, change_strategy, current_cost):
"""
True -> ’u’ can improve the cost
"""
dec_add, c_add, move_add = self.check_best_add(u, current_cost)
dec_del, c_del, move_del = self.check_best_del(u, current_cost)
dec_swp, c_swp, move_swp = self.check_best_swp(u, current_cost)
if dec_add or dec_del or dec_swp:
move = None
if not change_strategy:
return True
c_min = min(c_add, c_del, c_swp)
if c_min == c_del:
self.Game.del_edges(u, [move_del])
move = (’del’,u,move_del)
elif c_min == c_swp:
self.Game.del_edges(u, [move_swp[0]])
self.Game.add_edges(u, [move_swp[1]])
move = (’swp’,u,(move_swp[0],move_swp[1]))
else:
self.Game.add_edges(u, [move_add])
move = (’add’,u,move_add)
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return True, move
return False, None
def turnPolicy(self):
cost_list = []
for u in range(self.Game.n):
cost = self.Game.calc_cost(u)
cost_list.append((u,cost))
if self.policy == Policy.RANDOM: # random order
shuffle(cost_list)
return cost_list
else: # max cost order
return sorted(cost_list, key=lambda x : x[1])
def executeDynamics(self):
steps = 0
Stable = False
trace = []
while not Stable:
Stable = True
node_list = self.turnPolicy() # list of (node,cost)
while node_list:
u, c = node_list.pop() # pop last element of list
changed, move = self.perform_local_search_step(u, True, c)
if changed:
trace.append(move)
steps += 1
Stable = False
if self.Game.n**2 < steps:
with open(’log.txt’,’a’) as f:
f.write(’Did␣not␣converge␣in␣nˆ2␣steps\n’)
break
return steps, trace
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